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I. INTRODUCTION
Alternative proposals for the reform of state legislation
dealing with the forfeiture of property for drug offenses are
being recommended to state legislatures by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("Confer-
ence")1 and the President's Commission on Model State Drug
Laws ("Commission").' These proposals share a common origin
t Mr. Pepe is a partner in the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania office of the law firm of
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart and a Pennsylvania Commissioner on the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. He served as the Chairman of a Drafting
Committee responsible for recommending forfeiture amendments to the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act of 1990 (hereinafter U.C.SA) to the Conference.
1. The Conference approved the recommended revisions to the U.C.SA. at its
annual meeting in Chicago, Illinois, on August 4, 1994. The Conference previously
reviewed draft amendments to the forfeiture provisions of the U.C.SA at its 1991 and
1993 annual meetings.
2. The President's Commission on Model State Drug Laws, Executive Summary,
Dec. 1993. The recommendations of the Commission are contained in five separate
volumes: Economic Remedies Against Drug Traffickers, Dec. 1993 (hereinafter Eonomic
Remedies); Community Mobilization, Dec. 1993; Crimes CodeEnforcement, Dec. 1993; Alcohol
and OtherDrug Treatment, Dec. 1993; and Drug-Free Families, Schools and Workpaces, Dec.
1993. The forfeiture recommendations of the Commission are contained in the
Economic Remedies, Section A. Other recommendations of the Commission relating to
1
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and framework, as well as pursue similar goals and objectives.
They differ, however, with respect to the degree of procedural
and substantive protections afforded to private property
interests.
This essay reviews the common features and differences
between the recommendations of the Conference and the
Commission and also explores their theoretical and policy
differences.
II. ORIGIN OF THE PROPOSALS
The recommendations of both the Conference and the
Commission arose out of efforts to draft revisions to the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (U.C.S.A.).1 The
U.C.S.A. authorized the seizure and forfeiture of: (1) controlled
substances manufactured, distributed, dispensed or acquired in
violation of the Act; (2) raw materials, equipment and contain-
ers used in manufacturing, compounding, processing or
delivering controlled substances in violation of the Act; (3)
conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles and vessels used to
transport property used in violation of the Act; and (4) books,
records and research materials used in violation of the Act.4
The original Act did not set forth administrative or judicial
economic remedies are the adoption of model acts dealing with demand reduction
assessments, money laundering, financial transaction reporting, money transmission
and on-going criminal conduct. See generally Economic Remedies.
3. U.C.S.A. §§ 101-607, 9 U.L.A. 1 (1970) (amended 1990).
4. See U.C.SA. § 505(a). Forfeiture law has a lengthy history. In Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., the U.S. Supreme Court traced forfeiture law back to the
Biblical notion of the deodand. 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974). The deodand was the
notion that when an instrument caused death it was accused and atonement was
required. Id. The instrument was forfeited to the King "in the belief that the King
would provide money for Masses to be said for the good of the dead man's soul, or
insure that the deodand was put to charitable uses." Id. After the religious aspects of
the deodand ceased to exist, the deodand continued to be a source of revenue for the
Crown. Id. Forfeitures were justified because there was a breach of the King's peace
and that breach justified the denial of the right to own property. Id. at 682. The
notion of the deodand did not become part of the common law of this country, but
rather statutory forms of forfeiture were enacted to achieve the same results. Id. at
682-83. See also George N. Aylesworth, BuREAU OF JUSTICE AsSISTANcE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JuSTIE, Forieture of Real Propery: An Ovmiew, (Bureau ofJustice Assistance 1991) at
7 (stating that the history of forfeiture dates to Biblical times); Scott A. Nelson,
Comment, The Supreme Court Takes a Weapon from the Drug War Arsenak New Defenses to
Civil Drug Forfeiture, 26 ST. MaW's L.J. 157, 161-64 (1994) (stating that historians trace
the concept of forfeiture back to the Biblical laws of Exodus).
[Vol.21
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requirements for the seizure, forfeiture or release of property
and did not establish detailed requirements relating to the
assertion of "innocent owner" defenses or for the utilization of
revenues generated through the forfeiture of property.5
Subsequent to the adoption of the U.C.S.A., several
important federal statutes were enacted relating to the seizure
and forfeiture of property associated with drug law offenses. This
led to numerous non-uniform amendments to the U.C.S.A.
These federal statutes included the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Law,6 the Continuing Criminal Enterprise
statute,7 amendments to the Controlled Substances Act,' the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,' the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986,10 and the Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments
Act of 1988.11 In 1985, the Conference appointed a drafting
committee to amend the 1970 version of the U.C.S.A. 2 The
primary goal of the committee was to update and revise the
forfeiture provisions of the U.C.S.A. to reflect the numerous
developments in forfeiture and seizure law which have occurred
since adoption of the Act.
The drafting committee prepared draft amendments for
consideration by the Conference at its 1986, 1987, 1988 and
1989 annual meetings.'3 Included in the recommended 1990
amendments was a new Article V of the U.C.S.A. providing for
civil forfeiture. The 1990 amendments, including the forfeiture
5. See U.C.S.A. § 505 (1970); see also U.C.SA § 505 commentary to (b) and (c)
(amended 1990). The 1970 U.C.SA. was promulgated to supplant the Uniform Drug
Act (1933) and the Model State Drug Abuse Control Act (1966). The 1970 version of
the U.C.SA is the basis for legislation in approximately 48 states.
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
7. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988).
8. Id. § 881.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
10. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1988).
11. Id.
12. The 1990 revisions to the U.C.SA were prepared by a Drafting Committee
chaired by David A. Gibson of Brattleboro, Vermont. The Drafting Liaison and
Reporter for the Committee was Jay E. Buringrud of Bismarck, North Dakota.
13. Under the rules of the Conference, drafting committees composed of members
of the Conference together with official and unofficial advisors and observers prepare
drafts for recommendation by the Conference. In order to take final action regarding
a proposed uniform act, the proposal must be read and debated line-by-line at not less
than two annual meetings of the Conference and must be adopted by a vote of the
states. 1993-94ReferenceBook, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Constitution and Bylaws, §§ 4.2 & 8.1.
1995)
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provisions, were endorsed by the U.S. Justice Department,14 the
Office of National Drug Control Policy,15 the National Associa-
tion of Attorneys General16 and the National District Attorneys
Association,17 as well as by numerous other advisors to the
drafting committee. 8
Although the committee's 1990 recommendations repre-
sented a carefully balanced compromise developed by the
members, advisors and various consultants to the committee, the
consensus relating to forfeiture issues proved too fragile to
survive. At the 1990 annual meeting, many members of the
Conference expressed disapproval of Article V's provisions
dealing with the burden of proof in forfeiture actions (probable
cause rather than preponderance of the evidence), the exclusive
dedication of forfeiture revenues to law enforcement agencies,
and the absence of measures for mitigation or remission of
excessive forfeitures. The policy issues identified by members of
the Conference were reflective of an emerging call for the re-
evaluation of forfeiture laws by academic, media and congressio-
nal commentators.1 9
In spite of vigorous debate triggered by the proposed
Article V of the U.C.S.A., the Conference approved the 1990
U.C.S.A. Amendments, but withheld final action on Article V.
The Conference then appointed a new drafting committee and
instructed it to perform a comprehensive review of forfeiture
laws. In addition to representatives of the law enforcement
community, the new committee added advisors and consultants
14. Letter from Dick Thornburgh, United States Attorney General, to members
of the Conference (July 11, 1990).
15. Letter from William J. Bennett, Director of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy, to members of the Conference (July 12, 1990).
16. Letter from Don Hanaway, Attorney General of Wisconsin, President of the
National Association of Attorneys General, to members of the Conference (July 1,
1990).
17. Letter from Lynn C. Slaby, President of the National District Attorneys
Association, to members of the Conference (June 29, 1990).
18. Letter from George Bush, President of the United States, to members of the
Conference (July 12, 1990); see also, American Prosecutors Research Institute, Handbook:
The Uniform Controlled Substances Act, Overview and Analysis of the Proposed Amendments,
1990.
19. As illustrative of the controversy which emerged regarding forfeiture policies
prior to the 1990 annual meeting of the Conference, see Michael Goldsmith and Mark
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representing various financial and commercial interests,
including the American Bankers Association, the National
Association of Realtors and the American College of Real Estate
Lawyers." The drafting committee met in the fall and spring
of 1990 and prepared initial recommendations for consideration
by the Conference in the summer of 1991.
The recommendations prepared by the drafting committee
in the spring of 1991 shifted the burden of proof for in rem
forfeiture to preponderance of the evidence, provided for the
deposit of revenues generated by forfeitures into general
operating funds, and prohibited "disproportionate" forfei-
tures.21 After reviewing these recommendations, the U.S.
Department of Justice, the National Association of State
Attorneys General and the National Association of District
Attorneys announced a decision to withdraw as advisors to the
drafting committee.22 Instead, these groups recommended that
20. In addition to the author, current and former members of the Committee
include: Bryce Baggett of Oklahoma City; C. Arlen Beam of the U.S. Court of Appeals;
Marion Benfield of the Wake Forest University School of Law; William Breetz of the
Hartford, Connecticut, law firm of Rogin, Nassau, Caplan, Lassman & Hirtle; Phillip
Carroll of the Rose law firm of Little Rock, Arkansas; Jack Davies of the Minnesota
Court of Appeals; Sidney Eagles of the North Carolina Court of Appeals; Robinson
Everett of the Military Court of Appeals and Duke Law School; David Gibson of
Brattleboro, Vermont; Alvin Meiklejohn,Jr., a member of the State Senate of Colorado
and the Denver law firm of Jones & Keller;, Donald E. Mielke, District Attorney of
Golden, Colorado; and Fred H. Miller, Executive Director of the Conference. The
Reporter for the Committee is Professor Kevin Cole of the University of San Diego
School of Law. Terrance Reed of the Washington, D.C. law firm of Asbli, Junkin &
Myers served as the American Bar Association Advisor to the Drafting Committee.
Official observers and active participants included representatives of the American
Bankers Association, the College of Real Estate Lawyers, the National Association of
Realtors and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
21. U.C.SA. §§ 501, 520 (1991 Draft).
22. Representative of the comments made to the National Conference by the
representatives of the prosecutorial community are the following extracts from a letter
dated July 26, 1991, from the Honorable Ken Eikenberry, President of the National
Association of Attorneys General, to LawrenceJ. Bugge, the President of the National
Conference:
The new drafting committee, propelled by the positions taken by
some Commissioners in floor debate, has radically departed from the
law of forfeiture in the state and federal systems. It has produced a
set of provisions that would introduce concepts found in no state or
federal statute. Quite apart from the lack of merit of these provi-
sions, they carry a message of disdain for state legislators by
proposing that the basis for uniformity is to be found in provisions
never before passed in any state. ... Moreover, these radical
departures completely ignore the impracticality of training law
enforcement officers in the application of two widely divergent
1995]
5
Pepe: Alternative Proposals for the Reform of State Legislation Dealing
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
W/LL/AM MITCHELL LAW RE VE1W
the Conference endorse a Model Asset Seizure and Forfeiture
Act ("M.A.S.F.A."), which was prepared by the American
Prosecutors Research Institute under contract to the U.S.
Department of Justice.2" The provisions of M.A.S.F.A. closely
parallel provisions of Article V of the proposed 1990 Amend-
ments to the U.C.S.A. recommended earlier to the Con-
ference.24
Although the Conference made numerous requests that
representatives of the law enforcement community rejoin
discussions regarding amendments to the U.C.S.A., these
overtures were not successful.' In November 1993, U.S.
Attorney General Janet Reno declined a request to appoint an
advisor or observer to work with the Conference based on the
representation that the Justice Department was internally
preparing recommendations for the reform of federal forfeiture
laws.
26
statutes. Since virtually all state narcotics officers participate in
federal forfeiture activities, a uniform state statute must be at least
compatible with federal forfeiture law. The proposed draft is not.
Id.
23. The American Prosecutors Research Institute is the research, technical
assistance and programs affiliate of the National Association of District Attorneys.
24. Aside from some minor reorganization, the major differences between
M.A.S.FA4 and the proposed 1990 version of Article V of the U.C.S.A. deal with
attorney fees, warrant requirements, cost bonds and jury trial provisions. The 1990
version of the U.C.SA provides an exemption from forfeiture for "good faith"
payments of "reasonable" attorney's fees earned before a judicial determination that
property is subject to forfeiture, while MA.S.FA. authorizes a limited release of seized
property (upon the approval of the prosecutor) for the payment of attorney's fees when
other assets are not available. U.C.SA § 505 (a) (1990 Draft); MAS.FA § 11 (e). The
U.C.S.A. requires the issuance of a warrant prior to the seizure of property, except in
exigent circumstances, while MAS.F.A. allows seizure of property other than real estate
without a warrant "upon probable cause to believe [it] is subject to forfeiture."
U.C.S.A. § 507(a)-(b) (1990 Draft); M.A.S.F.A. § 6(b). MAS.F.A. contains provisions
not found in the U.C.S.A. requiring the payment of a cost bond as a prerequisite for
claiming exempt interests in property and requiring the resolution of factual issues
relating to forfeiture solely by ajudge. M.A.S.FA §§ 12(e), (g).
25. Invitations to send advisors, observers or specific comments and recommenda-
tions to Committee meetings were extended by the Committee to the U.S. Justice
Department, the National District Attorneys Association, the National Association of
Attorneys General and the National Drug Policy Office prior to each of the six drafting
committee meetings which were held between 1992 and 1994. Another invitation was
extended to these organizations to submit comments to the Conference prior to the
1994 Annual Meeting.
26. Letter from Irvin B. Nathan, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General to
members of the Conference (November 13, 1993).
[Voi.21
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Instead of resuming discussions with the Conference for the
purpose of developing compromise state legislation, the
prosecutorial community's efforts to further improve state
forfeiture law were incorporated into the work of the Commis-
sion. 7 The Commission modified M.A.S.F.A. in several areas
and published a recommended Commission Forfeiture Reform
Act ("C.F.R.A.").28
During the Commission's deliberations, the Conference's
drafting committee continued to develop recommendations for
amendments to the U.C.S.A. It also circulated for comment six
subsequent drafts of revisions and presented recommendations
for discussion at the Conference's 1993 annual meeting. The
final recommendations of the drafting committee were circulat-
ed for review and comment on June 1, 1994. The Conference
made minor amendments to the June 1, 1994 draft and
27. Establishment of the President's Commission was authorized by Section 7604'
of the Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-660, but the
Commission was not appointed by former President Bush until after the November
1992 general election. The work of the Commission was assigned to various task forces.
The Task Force on Economic Remedies was chaired by Kay B. Cobb, the Vice
Chairman of the Mississippi Senate Judiciary Committee and formerly Senior Attorney
of the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics and Executive Director of the Mississippi State
Prosecutor's Association. Other members of the task force were: Ramona L Barnes,
Speaker of the House of the State of Alaska; Keith M. Kaneshiro, Prosecuting Attorney
for Honolulu, Hawaii; Daniel E. Lundgren, Attorney General of California; and Edwin
L. Miller, District Attorney of San Diego, California. The Executive Director of the
Commission was Gary Tennis of the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office. The
Assistant Director was Sherry L Green of the American Prosecutors Research Institute.
As is evident from the membership list of the Economic Remedies Task Force, the
President's Commission failed to draw upon a broad cross section of competing
interests and perspectives in preparing its recommendations, but instead looked
primarily to the organized prosecutorial community.
28. The major differences between M.A.S.FA and the C.F.R.A. occur in the
following areas: The C.F.R.A. increases the government's initial burden of proof in
forfeiture actions from probable cause to a preponderance of the evidence. MAS.FA
§ 12(g); Commission Forfeiture Reform Act Pub. L. § 16(g). The C.F.R.A. restricts
administrative forfeitures to property valued at $15,000 or less. MAS.FA § 15(a);
C.F.RA. § 19(a). The C.F.R.A. provides for an optional diversion of 10% of forfeiture
revenues from law enforcement to drug treatment programs. M.A.S.FA § 16(b);
C.F.R.A. § 20(b). The C.F.RA. prohibits the forfeiture of real property for offenses
relating solely to the possession of controlled substances. C.F.RA. § 7(b) (2) (A). The
C.F.R.A. eliminates an exclusion previously found in M.A.S.FA denying innocent
owner exemptions tojoint tenants and tenants in the entireties. MAS.FA. § 5(b) (1);
C.F.RA. § 8(b). Finally, the C.F.R.A. adds provisions not found in MAS.FA allowing
the re-opening of forfeiturejudgments for up to 180 days in the event of failure to give
proper notice. C.F.R.A. § 19(b).
1995]
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approved the amendments at the Conference's Annual Meeting
on August 4, 1994 in Chicago, Illinois.29
Although the culmination of parallel drafting efforts, the
recommendations of the Commission and the Conference
reflect a different perspective regarding the extent to which the
protection of "innocent" private property interests can be
entrusted to prosecutorial discretion versus rules of law.
Generally, the C.F.R.A. vests broad discretion in prosecutorial
authorities in order to provide for the maximum flexibility to
pursue forfeiture actions.' In contrast, the recommended
amendments to the U.C.S.A. attempt to provide more extensive
procedural and substantive restrictions upon forfeiture proceed-
ings, both to prevent prosecutorial abuses and to avoid unin-
tended restrictions upon the flow of commerce."
III. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.C.S.A. AND THE C.FR.A.
A review of the 1994 Amendments to the U.C.S.A.
illustrates some of the principal areas in which the U.C.S.A. and
the C.F.R.A. differ in the treatment of asset forfeitures.
Significant differences between the U.C.S.A. and the C.ER.A.
exist with respect to the following: the substantive standards and
procedural requirements for claiming exemptions; limitations
upon excessive forfeitures; the utilization of revenues generated
by forfeiture proceedings; attorney fee exemptions; cost bonds
and the award of attorneys' fees and costs; the interim release of
property; and administrative forfeiture procedures.
A. Exemptions
The basic exemptions of property from forfeiture provided
by the U.C.SA and the C.ER.A. are similar. Both acts exempt
property acquired before conduct that allows forfeiture if the
29. The National Conference revised theJune 1, 1994 recommendations of the
Drafting Committee to: (1) require the deposit of all forfeiture revenues into state
general funds for appropriation; (2) establish a 30 day time period for initiation of
ancillary civil proceedings following a criminal conviction to adjudicate the claims of
alleged "innocent owners;" and (3) prevent the mandatory substitution of property in
criminal forfeiture proceedings when the principal property subject to forfeiture has
diminished in value due to routine use or casualty loss. U.C.SA §§ 419(i), 514(a),
522(h). The final amendments were approved by a vote of 49 states (the sole negative
vote being cast by the State of Washington).
30. See C.F.R.A. § 9.
31. U.C.S-A. § 507.
[Vol.21
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property owner did not "know" the conduct would occur or
acted "reasonably" to prevent the conduct.32  Similarly, both
acts exempt property interests acquired after conduct that allows
forfeiture if the owner acquired the property for value and did
not "know" that the conduct had occurred. 3 The proposals
differ, however, with respect to the standard applied to the
evaluation of "knowledge" and the type of measures required of
a property owner to "reasonably" prevent conduct that allows
forfeiture.
The U.C.S.A. provides that "[a] person knows a fact or acts
with knowledge if the person is aware of the existence of the
fact or displays willful blindness as to whether the fact exists.
" 3 1
It further provides that "a person displays willful blindness as to
whether a fact exists if the person is aware of a substantial
probability that the fact exists and consciously avoids informa-
tion corroborative of the existence of the fact."3 5 In contrast,
the C.F.R.A. does not define the term "know" and provides that
a person is only eligible for an exemption if the person "could
not reasonably have known of the act or omission or that it was
likely to occur. "36
The U.C.S.A. strives to avoid the implication that mere
negligence regarding knowledge vitiates eligibility for an
exemption. 7  In contrast, the C.F.RA. can be interpreted as
endorsing the use of a negligence standard.' The U.C.SA.
drafting committee concluded that the use a of negligence
standard is inadvisable because it would impose excessive
uncertainty upon commercial transactions.' Such a standard
also implies the existence of an underlying duty to be aware of
potential criminal conduct of third persons.'
The definition of "willful blindness" utilized in the U.C.S.A.
is patterned on federal criminal cases declaring certain forms of
avoiding knowledge - sometimes also called "deliberate
32. Id. § 505(b)(1), (c)(1); C.F.R.A. § 8(a) (1) (A).
33. U.C.S.A. § 505(b)(1); C.F.R.A. § 8(a) (1) (A).
34. U.C.S.A § 501(6).
35. Id.
36. C.F.R.A. § 8(a)(1)(A).
37. See U.C.SA § 501 cmt.
38. See supra note 36. Section 8(a) of the C.F.RA. refers to whether a person
could have "reasonably known" of an act or omission.
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ignorance" or "conscious avoidance" - as adequate to satisfy a
statute's requirement of "knowledge" for conviction." The
U.C.S.A.'s provisions in this area are consistent with prevailing
interpretations of federal law, while the C.ER.A. appears to
invite a re-evaluation of established federal precedent for the
purpose of expanding the scope of asset forfeitures.42
The U.C.S.A. also strives to avoid the implication that
negligence is the appropriate standard for the evaluation of
actions undertaken to prevent conduct that allows the forfeiture
of property. The U.C.S. conditions eligibility for an exemp-
tion upon actions that the owner reasonably believes are
appropriate to prevent the conduct or assist its prosection. 4s
Such a standard attempts to deviate from negligence jurispru-
dence by focusing upon the legitimate beliefs or intentions of a
person rather than upon an objective evaluation of the reason-
ableness of conduct." The C.F.RA., in contrast, looks to
whether the person "acted reasonably."'
In an effort to further clarify the meaning of the "reason-
able belief" standard, the U.C.S.A. contains a safe harbor
provision concerning actions taken to prevent or assist in the
prosecution of conduct that allows forfeiture.4' Under this
provision, a property owner will be deemed to have taken
sufficient measures to qualify for an exemption from forfeiture
if the owner notifies an appropriate law enforcement agency,
provides the law enforcement agency with information reason-
ably requested to prevent or prosecute the conduct, and takes
reasonable actions, in consultation with a law enforcement
agency, to discourage or prevent the illegal use of the proper-
ty.47 The U.C.S.A. states that under no circumstances will a
person be required to take any action that may threaten the
person's personal security or safety.'
41. See, e.g., United States v. Rothrock, 806 F.2d 318, 322 (1st Cir. 1986); United
States v. White, 794 F.2d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 1986); 1 EDwARD DEVrrr ET AL., FEDERAL
JURY PRATCrIE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 17.09 (4th ed. supp. 1994).
42. Compare United States v. 1980 Red Ferrari, 827 F.2d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 1987);
with United States v. One Single Family Residence, 933 F.2d 976 (11th Cir. 1991).
43. U.C.S.A. § 505(b) (2).
44. Id. § 505 cmt.
45. C.F.R.A. § 8(a)(1)(B).
46. U.C.SA § 505(k)(1), (2).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 505(k)(2).
[Vol.21
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The combination of the repudiation of a negligence
standard and the establishment of a safe harbor for measures
necessary to prevent conduct that allows forfeiture is intended
to both reduce the uncertainty regarding actions needed to
avoid the forfeiture of property and to provide a substantial
incentive for cooperation by property owners with law enforce-
ment agencies. Similar provisions are not found in the C.ER.A.
In addition to clarifying the scope of the basic exemptions
from forfeiture, the U.C.S.A. establishes a number of additional
procedural and substantive rules to protect the flow of legitimate
commerce. The U.C.S.A. provides that public property, statutory
or recorded liens for taxes, special assessments, fees due any
governmental entity, and utility, road, sewer and other ease-
ments are automatically exempt from forfeiture. 9 The term
public property refers to not only property held by general
purpose units of government, "but also property held by
authorities, quasi-governmental entities and public and private
trusts for the public benefit," exclusive of private interests in
such property.50 Because such property is held for the public
benefit, no rational purpose is served by requiring owners of
such interests to affirmatively claim their exemptions. Under
the C.ER.A., no automatic exemptions from forfeiture are
recognized, except for property sold or released by the state
following its seizure or forfeiture.
51
Likewise, the U.C.S.A. provides that certain types of
property interests in which there are low probabilities that
forfeiture will be sought will be deemed to be exempt unless the
state affirmatively gives notice that such property interests are
subject to forfeiture.52 In the event the state gives specific
notice of its intent to seek forfeiture of any of these interests,
eligibility for claimed exemptions must be established in the
same manner as for other exemptions.5 " Similar provisions are
49. Id. §505(a)(1)-(3).
50. Id. §505(a)(1) cmt
51. C.F.RA § 19(g).
52. U.C.S.A. § 505(0. These property interests includejudicial liens, liens created
by law, easements, covenants, restrictions, and reservations burdening property, rights
to remove natural resources from real property, recorded or perfected security interests
held by financial institutions, securitized property, purchase money mortgages or
pledges, and the interests of tenants in real estate when the conduct of a landlord
allows the forfeiture of the property. Id.
53. Id. § 505(h).
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not contained in the C.F.R.A. and, instead, all property owners
are required to affirmatively assert and establish their entitle-
ment to exemptions.54
The U.C.S.A. codifies a shelter principle for interests
acquired from persons who hold exempt interests in property
similar to the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C.") applicable to a holder in due course. 55 The rule
provides that the transfer of property exempt from forfeiture
vests in the transferee with any exemptions of the transferor,
unless the transferee engaged in conduct that allows forfeiture
or acts as an agent or nominee of a person whose conduct
allows forfeiture.56  This rule eliminates the need for all
subsequent transferees of an exempt interest holder to separate-
ly prove entitlement to an exemption. No similar provisions are
provided by the C.ER.A.
Similar to its recognition of a shelter principle, the U.C.S.A.
further provides that security interests, securitized property and
purchase money mortgages and pledges held by financial
institutions, which are presumptively exempt in lieu of notice of
a proposed forfeiture, are conclusively exempt in the hands of
a transferee who gives value prior to the receipt of such notice
by the transferor.5 These provisions are intended to preserve
the negotiability of property interests that are widely transferred
in secondary markets without creating unreasonable due-
diligence burdens upon the purchasers of such property. The
requirement that notice be given before the transfer of the
property is intended to facilitate the functioning of commercial
secondary markets dealing in security interests and securitized
property.58  The only equivalent provision of the C.ER.A.
authorizes the conditional interim release of property to
"regulated interest holders."59
The U.C.SA. recognizes the complexity of applying
exemption rules to executory service contracts, such as contracts
to provide engineering, architectural or legal services in which
a retainer is paid in advance of the provision of service. The
54. Id. § 505(g)-(h); C.F.P.A. § 15(i).
55. See U.C.C. § 3-203(b)(1989).
56. U.C.SA § 505(i), (1).
57. Id. § 505 (f)(j).
58. Id. § 505 cnt.
59. C.F.R.A. § 19(e).
[Vol.21
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss1/13
FOREFURES FOR DRUGS
U.C.S.A. provides that the state may forfeit property paid to a
contractor for goods or services not yet delivered if the contrac-
tor would not otherwise have a right to keep the property upon
a termination of the contract by a person whose conduct allows
forfeiture or if the contractor would not be required to continue
to perform notwithstanding the forfeiture of the property.'
"The contractor's interests will not be unfairly impinged upon
if other law would not have permitted the contractor to keep the
deposit had the contract been terminated without cause. If the
contractor would only be permitted to keep a portion of the
deposit, only that portion is exempt from forfeiture."6 Similar
provisions are not found in the C.ER.A.
Finally, the U.C.S.A. recognizes the difficulty of applying the
concept of acquiring property for value to spousal interests. The
Act recognizes a limited exemption for a spouse who would
qualify under the innocent owner provisions if he or she had
given value for an interest in a primary residence or the only
available automobile.62 States are directed to limit the dollar
value of the exemption to the property value.' Similar provi-
sions are not included within the C.FR.A.
Although these specialized features of the 1994 version of
the U.C.S.A. may be unnecessary in many circumstances because
responsible prosecutors will exercise their discretion to achieve
equivalent results, codifying the rules provides relief against
potential prosecutorial abuses and promotes the more efficient
functioning of commercial markets by reinforcing ordinary
commercial expectations. In typical commercial transactions,
due diligence cannot be satisfied by reliance upon expectations
regarding reasonable prosecutorial discretion.
B. Excessive Forfeitures
On June 28, 1993, the Supreme Court unanimously held
that civil and criminal forfeitures for violations of criminal laws
are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment.'4 Since its 1990 annual meeting, the Conference has
60. U.C.SA § 505(c)(2).
61. Id. § 505 cML
62. Id. § 505(c)(3).
63. Id. § 505(d).
64. See Austin v. United State, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993) (civil forfeiture);
Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2775-76 (1993) (criminal forfeiture).
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endorsed the concept that "excessive" forfeitures should be
subject to recision or modification.
The 1994 Amendments to the U.C.S.A. provide that a court
shall "limit the scope of a forfeiture judgment to the extent the
court finds the effect of the forfeiture is grossly disproportionate
to the nature and severity of the owner's conduct."5 In
determining whether a forfeiture is grossly disproportionate, the
U.C.S.A. provides that a court may consider: the "degree to
which property is used to facilitate conduct that allows forfei-
ture;" the economic gain received or expected to be received
from conduct that allows forfeiture; the value of the property
subject to forfeiture; the "nature and extent of the owner's
culpability;" and any actions taken by an owner to prevent the
illegal use of property or to assist the prosecution of such
actions.' If a court finds that forfeiture is grossly dispropor-
tionate, the court is required to designate the extent of the loss
that may be imposed on the owner.67 The U.C.S.A. treats
proportionality in the same way that the U.C.C. treats unconscio-
nability - as an issue to be decided as a matter of law by the
court.68
Because the decisions in Austin v. United States9 and
Alexander v. United States,7° failed to specify the appropriate
factors to consider in evaluating the excessiveness of a forfeiture,
it is inevitable that these factors will become the subject of
numerous debates, in and out of court. Officials of the U.S.
Justice Department, for example, have indicated that the
Department, in reliance on Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
in Austin, will argue that the only applicable factors to consider
in determining whether a forfeiture is violative of the Eighth
Amendment are: (1) whether criminal activity involving
property has been sufficiently extensive in terms of time and
use; (2) whether the role of the property was integral and
indispensable to the commission of the crime; and (3) whether
the property was deliberately selected to secure some special
65. U.C.S.A. § 520.
66. Id. § 520(1)-(3).
67. Id. § 522(0.
68. See U.C.C. §§ 2-302, 2A-108.
69. 113 S. Ct. at 2801.
70. 113 S. C. at 2766.
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advantage in the commission of a crime.71 Defense counsel,
however, will no doubt argue that an excessiveness analysis
should consider the harshness of penalties in light of the gravity
of offenses,72 sentences imposed for other offenses, and the
degree to which a civil forfeiture pursues legitimate remedial
objectives.73
Adoption of statutory standards similar to those embodied
in the U.C.S.A. may reduce the uncertainty inherent in the
implementation of the constitutional doctrine announced in
Austin and Alexander by establishing legal requirements which
will most likely meet or exceed constitutional requirements.
7 4
Limiting recision or modification only to "grossly disproportion-
ate" forfeitures and clarifying that excessiveness is a matter to be
determined exclusively by the trial court should further promote
predictability and finality with respect to forfeiture judgments.
Although the standard incorporated into the U.C.S.A. may
ultimately prove to be more protective of private property rights
than is constitutionally required, the creation of a flexible
judicial remedy to prosecutorial excesses may help preserve
forfeiture as a valuable law enforcement tool by helping restore
public confidence in the fairness and integrity of civil forfeiture
proceedings.
C. Utilization of Forfeiture Revenues
No single issue has drawn more enthusiastic debate at the
Conference's annual meetings than proposals "earmarking"
forfeiture revenues for law enforcement purposes. (For
example, the 1990 draft of the U.C.S.A. dedicated forfeiture
revenues remaining after the satisfaction of exempt interests and
71. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2815.
72. United States v. Certain Real Prperty and Premises Known as 38 Whalers Cove Drive,
954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992); United States v. Harris, 903
F.2d 770, 777-78 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir.
1987).
73. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2815.
74. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2801; Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2766. Illustrative of the
confusion likely to surround the implementation of the Austin and Alexander decisions
is a recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which attempted to adopt
Justice Scalia's interpretation of the Excessive Fines Clause. The court ruled that
forfeitures may only be based on a "pattern of similar incidents," established by the
state using "clear and convincing evidence that the criminal conduct in question is not
a onetime occurrence.... " In Re: King Properties, 635 A.2d 128, 133 (Pa. 1993).
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the payment of expenses to use by prosecutorial agencies in the
enforcement of the U.C.S.A.7"). In response to a motion at the
1990 annual meeting objecting to the exclusive use of forfeiture
revenues to support law enforcement activities, the 1991 draft
provided for the deposit of forfeiture revenues into the general
state treasury and made the revenues subject to the ordinary
76appropriations process.
Based upon suggestions of U.S.Justice Department officials,
the 1993 draft provided states with three alternatives regarding
the use of forfeiture revenues: (1) deposit into general operating
funds; (2) deposit into a restricted revenue account subject to
separate legislative appropriation; or (3) exclusive use for law
enforcement purposes. 7  At the Conference's 1993 annual
meeting, however, the latter two alternatives were deleted.78
The amendments presented for consideration at the
Conference's 1994 annual meeting provided that revenues
remaining after any payments to holders of exempt interests in
property and for forfeiture expenses were to be deposited into
a restricted revenue account. At the conclusion of each fiscal
period this revenue account was transferred to state or local
general operating funds. During the course of a fiscal period,
the account was authorized to be utilized for ongoing forfeiture
expenses. At the end of each fiscal period, the draft directs the
retention of a "working capital" balance ("working capital" is an
amount to be determined by the ordinary appropriations
process) to pay for ongoing forfeiture-related expenses.79 At
the 1994 annual meeting, however, the Conference further
75. U.C.SA § 519(b)(1990 Draft).
76. Id. § 518(e)(1991 Draft).
77. Id. § 522(e)(1993 Draft).
78. The Conference voted on August 2, 1993, by a vote of 58 to 35 to delete the
former two alternatives. Uniform Controlled Substance Act Amendments Artice 5, Civil
Foifeitu'r, PROCEEDINGS IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE (The Conference, Charles-
ton, S.C.), Aug. 2, 1993, at 139. The author opposed the motion on the grounds that:
(1) it is appropriate to ask persons acting in violation of criminal laws to pay for the
costs of enforcement and prosecution; (2) the earmarking of funds, although perhaps
not fiscally sound, is a well established practice in numerous other regulatory and law
enforcement purposes; (3) legislative oversight, auditing, conflict-of-interest laws and
professional codes of conduct can minimize the potential for abuse; and (4) although
it may be desirable for the Conference to offer guidance to the states regarding the use
of forfeiture revenues, there is no need for interstate uniformity with respect to
decisions regarding the expenditure of funds. Transcript of August 2, 1993, 132-36.
79. U.C.SA- § 522(h) (June 1, 1994 Draft).
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amended the U.C.S.A. to simply provide for the deposit of all
monies derived from forfeiture sales into the general fund of the
state.80
The provisions of the U.C.S.A. are based upon the proposi-
tion that giving seizing agencies direct financial incentives in
forfeiture is an unsound policy that risks skewing enforcement
priorities and creating conflicts of interest that may undermine
the impartiality and objectivity of law enforcement agencies.8'
In contrast to these recommendations, the C.F.R.A. continues to
allocate forfeiture revenues to law enforcement activities, with
the exception of an optional diversion of ten percent of
revenues to drug treatment programs.82  The C.F.RA. also
80. Id. Illustrative of the intensity of concerns regarding the use of forfeiture
revenues are the following extracts from the 1993 debate of the Conference:
What, in fact, you're looking at is the worst attribute of the routine
administration of criminal justice in the United States today, which
is that... the prosecutorial establishment profit[s] from having this
forfeiture money flowing through their coffers... I should hope we
have the courage to make sure that Alternative "A" [providing for
the deposit of revenues into general operating funds] is the only one
which is appropriate. Anything else is just plain venial.
Statement of CommissionerJohn Langbein of Connecticut, Uniform Controlled Substances
Ad Amendments Aricle 5, Civil Foifeiture, PROCEEDINGS IN COMMITrE= OF THE WHOLE
(The Conference, Charleston, S.C.), Aug. 2, 1993, at 114.
I think [the proposal to use forfeiture revenues for law enforcement
purposes] . .. is carrying privatization of public works a little too far.
It creates an overzealous attitude which is incompatible with
everything in the history of our law....
Statement of Commissioner M. Michael Cramer of Maryland, Uniform Controlled
Substances Ad Amendments Article 5, Civil Forfeiture, PROCEEDINGS IN COMMITrE OF THE
WHOLE (The Conference, Charleston, S.C.), Aug. 2, 1993, at 115.
One of the parts of our history of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence is that
we have tried to move away from [the privatization of the criminal
justice system]. We have tried to have objective quality decision
making based upon objective facts, not upon personal interest.
We're going backwards with this concept [of earmarking revenues
for law enforcement]. I wholeheartedly believe this motion [to
deposit revenues in general operating funds for ordinary appropria-
tion] would do more to promote equality and justice and a concept
of appropriateness in this whole field than anything else.
Statement of Commissioner Peter Langrock of Vermont, Unifom Controlled Substances
Aa Amendments Article 5, Civil Forfeiture, PROCEEDINGS IN COMMnTIE OF THE WHOLE
(The Conference, Charleston, S.C.), Aug. 2, 1993, at 116.
81. E.g. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct 2680, 2693 n.9 (1991) (opinion of Scalia,
J.) (Eighth Amendment may demand more careful scrutiny of fines than terms of
imprisonment because "fines are a source of revenue"). Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S.
245, 250 (1977) (declaring unconstitutional a system whereby unsalaried justice of
peace received $5 for each search warrant issued but nothing for refusing to issue a
warrant).
82. C.F.R.A. § 20(b).
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relies upon prosecutorial codes of ethics and conduct to prevent
abusive forfeiture practices.'
D. Attorney Fees
The U.C.S.A. provides specialized exemptions applicable to
attorney fees because the general rules exempting the interests
of "innocent owners" are not adequate to deal with the unique
problems raised by the attorney-client relationship. 4 Under
the rules ordinarily applicable to innocent owners, to preserve
their exemptions property owners must not willfully ignore acts
that give rise to forfeiture.' In representing a client, however,
an attorney has the responsibility to diligently seek all informa-
tion related to a client's defense.8 6 Attorneys are also required
to protect client confidences. Accordingly, attorneys are limited
in the extent to which information can be revealed to prevent
conduct that allows forfeiture or to reveal information necessary
for the prosecution of criminal offenses. Additionally, a desire
to protect fees may encourage attorneys to refuse to provide
defense services absent proof of a legitimate source for a fee.
The combination of these elements creates pressure on attorneys
which may interfere with the effective representation of clients
charged with drug offenses. Attorney-client relationships are
severely jeopardized if attorneys are penalized for knowing
information necessary for their clients' defense. The risk of
forfeiture could lead attorneys to fail to abide by their ethical
obligations to encourage full disclosure from their clients.8 7
To avoid this undesirable consequence, the U.C.S.A.
provides states with three optional provisions on the issue of
attorney fees. The U.C.S.A. provides that "[a]n interest in
83. Id. § 20 crn.
84. See U.C.SA § 506.
85. Id. §§501(6),505(b)(1).
86. ABA MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT, Rule 1.2(c); 1.6; 1.14(1983).
87. Compare ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION, §§ 4-3.1(a), 4-3.2(b) (1993) (stating that an attorney "should
explain the necessity of full disclosure of all facts known to the client" and it is
unprofessional conduct for the lawyer to "intimate to the client in any way that the
client should not be candid in revealing facts so as to afford defense counsel free rein
to take action which would be precluded by counsel's knowing of such facts") with
United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-111.230 (Oct. 1, 1990) (stating that requiring
attorneys to prove lack of reasonable cause to suspect forfeitability of fee "may prevent
the free and open exchange of information between an attorney and a client").
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property acquired by an attorney as payment of or as security for
payment of a reasonable fee for legal services in a criminal
matter.., is exempt from forfeiture unless": (1) the attorney
was "aware at the time the interest was acquired that the
property was subject to forfeiture" ("alternative one"); (2) the
attorney knew "before the interest was acquired ... of ajudicial
determination of probable cause that the property was subject
to forfeiture" ("alternative two"); or (3) the payment "represents
a fraud or sham to protect the interest from forfeiture" ("alter-
native three"). In all cases, the state has the burden of
proving that an exemption claimed for attorney fees is not
applicable. 9 The state may not utilize "evidence made avail-
able by the compelled disclosure of confidential communica-
tions between attorney and client, other than [non-privileged]
information relating to attorney fees."' In addition, the
U.C.S.A. provides that states may choose not to include any
special provisions relating to attorney fees and handle attorney
fees using the general exemption provided for "innocent
owners," especially as applied to contractors with obligations
under executory service contracts.91
The first alternative is based upon informal guidelines of
the U.S. Department of Justice that preclude any forfeiture of
fees paid in a criminal case if the attorney lacked "actual
knowledge" that the fee was forfeitable.92 This alternative is
broader than the federal practice, however, because it also
covers attorneys who become aware of the forfeitability of
payments after accepting them. Federal practice focuses on the
attorney's mental state when the fee was earned. Accordingly,
when an attorney comes to possess actual knowledge that the
advance payment was forfeitable, his or her fees earned subse-
quently are not immune from forfeiture. In contrast, the first
alternative provided by the U.C.S.A. focuses on the attorney's
mental state at the time the interest in the payment was
acquired - that is, when the attorney first accepted the payment
in return for a promise to provide services. This alternative is
preferable to federal practice, because it ensures that attorneys
88. U.C.S.A. § 506(a).
89. Id. § 506(b).
90. Id.
91. Id. § 505 (c)(2) cmt.
92. United States Attorneys'Manua4 §§ 9-111.430 (October 1, 1990).
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will not develop personal motives to avoid acquiring full
information from their clients. It also protects defense counsel
from the forced choice between either assuming the risk of
working for free after knowledge is acquired or jeopardizing a
client's assets by withdrawing representation, indicating
forfeitability may exist."
The U.C.S.A.'s second alternative provision for attorney
fees (i.e. knowledge of a judicial determination that property is
subject to forfeiture) allows an advance fee even when the
attorney has actual knowledge that the fee is tainted. This
alternative may be preferable to alternative one for several
reasons. First, under the first alternative (i.e. actual knowledge),
private attorneys may be reluctant to represent drug defendants.
An attorney without actual knowledge of the forfeitability of a
fee may be concerned that a factfinder will later erroneously
conclude that the attorney possessed actual knowledge when the
fee was received. The second alternative may be preferable to
the first because it also removes incentives to avoid learning all
the facts about a case at its inception. The practical effect of the
difference between the two alternatives is that under both
alternatives attorneys will seek to collect fees prior to interview-
ing clients, then, under alternative one, decline representation.
Clients rejected in this manner may continue to seek representa-
tion but cease to make full disclosure of important information.
The third alternative attorney fees provision offered in the
U.C.S.A. limits the forfeitability of amounts paid as attorney fees
based upon the 1985 and 1986 recommendations of the House
of Delegates of the American Bar Association. Alternative three
protects attorney fees from forfeiture unless the attorney by
accepting the fees is engaging in a fraud or sham transaction
intended to protect the illegal conduct of the client. The third
alternative is the most protective of the attorney-client relation-
ship.
93. Notwithstanding the apparent difference between the first alternative and
federal practice, as applied, the differences may be less significanL Because U.S.Justice
Department policy forbids compelling disclosure of confidential communications to
establish forfeitability of the attorney's fee in the same manner as provided by the
U.C.SA, attorneys who do acquire actual knowledge of the forfeitability of their fee
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The C.ER.A. rejects any exemption for attorney fees.
Instead it allows a person charged with a criminal offense to
"apply to the court where a forfeiture proceeding is pending for
the release of property seized .. . to pay necessary" legal
expenses for a criminal defense.94 Unless the petition is not
opposed by the state, however, the C.ER.A. only allows the
release of property if "there is no probable cause for the
forfeiture of property."5 Such a provision allows the prosecu-
tion to directly and improperly interfere with the defendant's
selection of counsel.
In rejecting a special exemption for attorney fees, the
Commission concluded that an exemption is unwarranted
because it would permit a wrongdoer to benefit from miscon-
duct by using drug proceeds to retain private counsel rather
than making do with less expensive counsel or court-appointed
counsel. The Commission also compares an exemption for
attorney fees to permitting attorneys to receive their fees in the
form of money stolen from a bank.'
Neither of these justifications appears particularly compel-
ling. Generally, the relevance of an attorney fee exemption
arises prior to a criminal conviction for conduct that allows
forfeiture. Accordingly, the practical impact of denying an
exemption for attorney fees may be to deprive a defendant of
access to counsel prior to a determination that the property may
be subject to forfeiture. Likewise, the Commission's analogy
regarding the use of stolen property confuses the rights of crime
victims with those of the state. Unlike a crime victim, the state
is better able to bear the loss of property that it might otherwise
have forfeited. Because the state would often be compelled to
pay for the defense of the wrongdoer if the fee were forfeitable,
it is a mistake to consider the entire sum a loss. Moreover, the
goal of depriving the wrongdoer of illicitly acquired assets is
accomplished if they are expended during the judicial pro-
cess.
97
94. C.F.RA § 15(f).
95. Id. § 15(g).
96. Economic Remedies at A-41.
97. See Commonwealth v. Hess, 617 A.2d 307, 314 (Pa. 1992). The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court used this reasoning to support its conclusion that the Pennsylvania
Constitution forbids a state, prior to conviction, from restraining a criminal defendant's
lawyer from using a possibly forfeitable retainer, even respecting portions of the
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E. Cost Bonds and the Award of Attorney Fees and Costs
The 1990 draft of Article V of the U.C.S.A. required a
person claiming an exempt interest in property subject to
forfeiture to post a bond of $2,500, or a greater amount as the
court may determine, upon the condition that in the event of
forfeiture, the claimant must pay the costs and expenses of the
proceeding. 98 Upon final judgment, the 1990 draft authorized
the court, in its discretion, to order the payment of costs and
expenses, including attorney fees and costs of investigation, to
the prevailing party.9 The draft prohibited an order directing
the state to pay fees and costs, however, if the court finds that
there was reasonable cause for the seizure, forfeiture or
forfeiture proceedings 0 0°
The provisions of the 1990 draft are similar to current
federal law. Under Section 1608 of Title 19 of the United States
Code, a person claiming property that has been seized must file
a bond in the penal sum of $5,000 or ten percent of the value
of the claimed property, whichever is lower, but not less than
$250, to secure all of the costs and expenses of the proceed-
ing.1"' In addition, federal law authorizes the award of costs
to prevailing parties in civil actions brought by or against the
government, but limits the award of costs in civil forfeiture
actions to situations in which there was not a reasonable cause
for the forfeiture.10 2
The 1991 draft of the U.C.S.A. eliminated both the cost
bond provisions and provisions for the award of fees and costs
to prevailing parties.'0 3 In preparing these revisions to the
1990 text, the drafting committee concluded that the award of
fees and costs should be left to other state law, including
emerging state statutes similar to the Equal Access to Justice Act,
which provides for the award of fees and costs to parties
litigating with the government if the position of the government
retainer that the attorney had not yet earned at the time of acquiring knowledge that
the fee was paid with tainted funds. Id.
98. U.C.S.A. § 515(0(1990 Draft).
99. Id. §518(t)(1990 Draft).
100. Id. §518(e)(1990 Draft).
101. 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1988).
102. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(a), 2465 (1988).
103. U.C.S.A. §§ 515(d), 516(f)(2)(1991 Draft).
[Vol.21
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss1/13
FORFErTURES FOR DRUGS
was not "substantially justified.""°4 These revisions arose from
a perception that it is inappropriate to require a person not
accused or charged with criminal conduct to post bonds and risk
liability for costs and expenses to defend a claim to private
property.
Contrary to the 1991 recommendations of the drafting
committee, the C.ER.A. restores and modifies the cost bond and
cost and fee provisions of the 1990 version of the U.C.S.A. The
C.F.R.A. requires a person claiming an innocent owner exemp-
tion from forfeiture to file a "cost" bond of $2,500 or ten
percent of the property's value, whichever is greater, up to a
maximum of $250,000.15 An exception is provided, however,
for a person proceeding in forma pauperis.10 6 The C.ER.A.
also provides that a claimant who fails to establish that a
"substantial portion" of the claimant's interest is not exempt
from forfeiture must pay the reasonable costs and expenses of
any claimant who establishes entitlement to an exemption and
the costs and expenses of the state for the investigation and
prosecution of the matter, including reasonable attorney
fees.107 The C.F.R.A. does not, however, restore provisions of
the 1990 U.C.S.A. allowing courts to award costs and fees to
claimants, but does insulate the government from paying costs
and damages to claimants if there was "reasonable cause" for
seizure or forfeiture of property. °8
The G.ERA. both substantially increases bonding require-
ments and exposes claimants to potential exposure to a broader
range of costs and fees. By providing an exemption for the
payment of costs and damages to the government, but requiring
the payment of costs and expenses in all cases by the defendant,
the C.F.RA in effect follows the British rule"° when the State
wins but the American rule11 when the State loses.
The 1994 Amendments to the U.C.S. seek to restore a
reasonable balance of remedies available to both the state and
defendants to recover attorney fees and costs. The U.C.S.A.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
105. C.F.R.A. § 16(e).
106. Id.
107. Id. § 19(i).
108. Id. § 19(h).
109. Id.
110. Id. § 19(i).
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does not impose a cost bond requirement, but instead provides
for the award of fees and costs to a prevailing party if the
position of the opposing party was not "substantially justi-
fied.""
1
F Expedited Release of Property
Both the C.F.R.A. and the 1994 Amendments to the
U.C.S.A. include provisions to facilitate the expeditious release
of property following either its seizure, or the filing or recording
of a forfeiture lien. Both proposals require the release of
property if timely forfeiture proceedings are not initiated, if the
state lacks probable cause for forfeiture, or upon the substitution
of a bond or other property in lieu of the property subject to
forfeiture." 2 The proposals differ substantially, however, with
respect to the extent and effectiveness of the release provisions.
The C.ER.A. requires the "temporary release" of property
to the owner "as custodian for the court, pending further
proceedings."'1 3 Temporary release occurs when the state fails
to file a notice of pending forfeiture against the property within
ninety days after seizure of the property, or fails to commence
ajudicial forfeiture proceeding within ninety days after a notice
of pending forfeiture is filed upon which a proper and timely
"claim" is filed. 1 A claim is filed in response to a notice of
pending forfeiture by either filing an answer in a judicial
proceeding asserting a claim to the property which is not subject
to forfeiture, or by requesting the administrative recognition of
an exempt interest in property."5
The 1994 Amendments to the U.C.S.A. require the prose-
cuting attorney to commence an administrative or judicial
forfeiture proceeding within ninety days after seizing property
or filing or recording a forfeiture lien, unless the court extends
the time for good cause shown.1 6  The commencement of
"administrative forfeiture proceedings" serves the same function
under the U.C.SA. as the filing of a "notice of forfeiture" under
the C.ER.A. If timely administrative or judicial forfeiture
111. U.C.SA § 524(e).
112. U.C.SA § 511; C.F.R.A. § 10.
113. C.F.R.A. § 11 (a)(1).
114. Id.
115. Id. § 11(a)(2).
116. U.C.SA § 519(a).
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proceedings are not commenced by the state, the U.C.S.A.
requires the release of property and liens and prohibits a later
seizure, lien or forfeiture proceeding based upon the same
conduct allowing forfeiture." 7
Although the C.F.R.A. does provide for "temporary release"
of property if the state fails to initiate timely forfeiture proceed-
ings, property is only released to the owner as "custodian for the
court" and continues to remain subject for an indefinite period
to forfeiture claims."' In contrast, the U.C.S-.A provides that
if the state fails to initiate timely administrative or judicial
forfeiture proceedings, the property is unconditionally released
to the owner and the state is prevented from subsequently
initiating forfeiture proceedings based on the same conduct
involved in the first proceeding." 9 The provisions of the
U.C.S.A are based upon the premise that the state should not be
allowed to deprive persons of the ownership and full enjoyment
of property rights without the timely commencement ofjudicial
or administrative proceedings.
120
Regardless of whether timely forfeiture proceedings are
commenced, the C.ER.A. provides for an expedited probable
cause hearing after five days notice to the prosecuting attorney
if property has been seized or made subject to a forfeiture lien
without a previous judicial determination of probable cause.1
2 1
In order to request a probable cause hearing, an owner must file
an application within ten days after notice of the seizure of
property or the filing of a lien, or actual knowledge of seizure
or the filing of a lien. 22 If the court concludes at the hearing
that there is no probable cause for the forfeiture of the proper-
ty, or if the state elects not to contest the issue, the property
must be released "to the applicant, as custodian for the court, or
from the lien pending the outcome of a judicial proceed-
ing."
123
The 1994 Amendments to the U.C.SA also provide for
expedited probable cause hearings. The U.C.SA requires a
117. Id. § 519(c).
118. C.F.R.A. § 16(e).
119. U.C.SA § 519(c).
120. See generally id.
121. C.F.R.A. § 15(c)(1).
122. Id. § 15(c)(2).
123. Id. § 15(d).
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probable cause hearing within thirty days of the service of a
petition requesting a hearing, unless the court delays the
hearing upon the consent of the parties or for good cause) 4
If the state fails to demonstrate probable cause for the forfeiture
of the property, the court must order the release of the property
and any forfeiture liens. 25 The state may satisfy its burden of
proof by evidence of a previous judicial determination based
upon conduct that allows forfeiture under the U.C.S.A. and
entered by a state or federal court, or administrative agency.
26
Finally, the U.C.S.A. provides that if property or a lien has been
released for lack of probable cause, knowledge that the property
had been seized or a lien filed and subsequently released, does
not constitute knowledge regarding conduct that allows forfei-
ture for the purpose of defeating innocent owner exemp-
tions. 1
2 7
The provisions of the C.F.R.A. and the U.C.S.A. with respect
to probable cause hearings differ in two significant respects.
First, the U.C.S.A. requires a probable cause hearing within
thirty days of a request, unless a court postpones the hearing
upon the consent of the parties or for good cause. 2  The
C.F.R.A. requires five days prior notice to the prosecuting
attorney, but does not set a time period in which the hearing
must be conducted." The C.F.R.A., accordingly, does not
mandate timely interim relief from unjustified seizures or liens.
Second, as was the case with the release of property for failure
to initiate timely proceedings, the C.F.RLA. only provides for
release to the applicant as custodian for the court and continues
to make the property subject to forfeiture."s Under the
U.C.S.A., if the state cannot prove probable cause for forfeiture,
the property must be unconditionally released.'3' The mere
seizure of property or the filing of a lien followed by release of
property for lack of probable cause does not constitute "knowl-
edge" regarding conduct that allows forfeiture. 32  The
124. U.C.S.A. § 511(c).
125. Id. § 511(0.
126. Id. § 507(b).
127. Id. § 505(n).
128. Id. § 511(c).
129. C.F.R.A. § 15(c).
130. Id. § 15(d).
131. U.C.S-A § 511(0.
132. Id. § 505(n).
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U.C.S.A. assumes that if the state cannot prove even probable
cause for the forfeiture of property, the owner has an uncondi-
tional right to the release of the property.
In addition to allowing the release of property for a failure
to commence proceedings in a timely manner and for a lack of
probable cause, the C.F.R.A. allows the owner of seized property
to obtain the release of the property by posting with the
prosecuting attorney a surety bond or cash in an amount equal
to the full market value of the property "as determined by the
attorney for the state." The prosecutor may refuse to release the
property if the bond tendered is inadequate, the property is
retained as contraband or as evidence, or the property is
"particularly altered or designed for use in conduct giving rise
to forfeiture." If a surety bond or cash is posted and the
property is forfeited, the court forfeits the surety bond or cash
in lieu of the property.
133
The 1994 Amendments to the U.C.S.A. allow property to be
released upon the posting of a bond or other "substituted
property," either in an administrative forfeiture proceeding, 134
at a preliminary hearing," or in the course of a judicial
forfeiture proceeding." 6 In each instance, an owner is enti-
tled to substitute property if "its value equals or exceeds the
value of the original property upon the date of substitution."137
The conditions may be imposed upon the acceptance of the
substituted property to protect the state's interest in the
forfeiture proceeding, to prevent future violations of the law and
to minimize obligations relating to the maintenance or manage-
ment of the substituted property." Finally, the original
property must not be contraband, evidence, or not particularly
suited for use in illegal activities.3 9 The court or prosecuting
attorney may accept property of lesser value than the original
property, including a secured or unsecured agreement to honor
a forfeiture judgment, if the owner "establishes a high probabili-
ty that the owner's interest in the original property is exempt
133. Id.
134. Id. § 513(a).
135. Id. § 511(a) (3).
136. Id. § 510(b).
137. Id. § 510(a)(1).
138. Id. § 510(a)(2).
139. Id. § 510(a)(4).
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from forfeiture ... "140 The U.C.S.A. clarifies that "[u]pon
the substitution of property, the original property must be
released, any lien upon it removed..." and forfeiture proceed-
ings terminated.' The substituted property, however, is
subject to forfeiture to the same extent as the original property,
but the original property is no longer subject to forfeiture for
the same conduct upon which the original forfeiture proceed-
ings were based. 42
By allowing the substitution of property in both administra-
tive and judicial proceedings, the U.C.S.A. guarantees ajudicially
enforceable right to request the substitution of property. In
addition, by allowing a court to adjust the value of a bond or
other substitute property required based upon the likelihood
that a claimant will prevail in proving entitlement to an
exemption, the U.C.S.A. allows a court to consider equitable
factors in determining the amount of substitute property
required.
In addition to allowing the substitution of property, the
U.C.S.A. further authorizes the release of property in administra-
tive proceedings, preliminary hearings or during judicial
proceedings if less restrictive alternatives exist to the seizure of
real property.43 Alternatives to the seizure of real property
recognized under the U.C.S.A. include the execution of an
occupancy agreement, the designation of substitute property or
the entry of a restraining order. 44 These alternatives are
deemed acceptable if they "adequately protect the state's interest
in forfeiture, including the state's interest in income generated
by the property and in preventing future violations of law.""
Although both the C.F.R.A. and the U.C.S.A. prohibit the
seizure of real property without an opportunity for a prior
adversarial hearing, in exigent circumstances, the C.F.R.A. only
limits seizure of real property if the state lacks probable
cause.' 4 The U.C.S.A., in contrast, considers whether seizure
140. Id. § 510(a)(1).
141. Id. § 510(d).
142. Id.
143. Id. § 507(c)(1).
144. Id. § 507(c)(2).
145. Id. § 507(c)(1)(ii).
146. C.F.R.A § 9(c).
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is the most appropriate remedy to protect the interests of the
state pending the outcome of forfeiture proceedings.'47
G. Administrative Forfeiture Proceedings
Both the G.ER.A. and the U.C.S.A. establish administrative
procedures under which. forfeiture proceedings may be adjudi-
cated withoutjudicial involvement. The administrative proceed-
ings may be particularly important to owners of exempt interests
in property seeking an expeditious resolution of their claims.
The manner in which administrative proceedings are conducted
under the two proposals, however, differs significantly.
Under the C.ER.A., administrative proceedings are initiated
only if the state issues a "notice of pending forfeiture" within
ninety days of the seizure of property or the filing of a seizure
lien."4  The U.C.S.A., in contrast, allows administrative pro-
ceedings to be initiated either by the filing of a notice of
pending forfeiture by the attorney for the state, 149 or by the
filing of a request for the administrative recognition of exempt
interests.150 Under the U.C.S.A., a property owner is not
required to await the filing of a notice of pending forfeiture to
file such a request.' This distinction is likely to be critical to
innocent owners seeking to regain property as soon as possible.
Under the C.ER.A., the state may delay the filing of a notice of
pending forfeiture for up to ninety days.
1 52
In the event a timely notice of pending forfeiture is filed by
the state, the C.ERA. requires that an answer or a request for
the recognition of an administrative exemption must be filed
within thirty days after the date of notice of a pending forfei-
ture."'3 No extensions to the thirty day period are authorized
for any reason."M If a request for the recognition of an
administrative exemption is filed, the C.ERA. provides that the
state may delay commencing ajudicial forfeiture proceeding for
147. See gmeeray U.C.SA § 507 (c)(1)(ii) and cmt.
148. C.F.R.A. § 11(a)(1).
149. U.C.SA § 512(a).
150. Id. § 513(a).
151. Id.
152. C.F.R.A. § 11 (a) (1) (A).
153. Id. § 11(a)(2).
154. Id. § 11(a) (3).
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180 days. 55 During this period the prosecuting attorney must
provide "regulated interest holders" a statement recognizing or
denying any claimed exempt interests within sixty days, and must
provide other property owners a statement recognizing or
denying claimed exempt interests within 120 days.'56 A "regu-
lated interest holder" is a business authorized to operate in the
particular state which is under the jurisdiction of banking,
securities, insurance or real estate regulating agencies.
57
If no party files exceptions to the administrative statement
of exempt and non-exempt interests, the state may either treat
the statement as a final adjudication of exempt and non-exempt
interests and dispose of the property, or commence judicial
forfeiture proceedings. 5 8 If the state does not initiate judicial
forfeiture proceedings, the C.ER. authorizes the state to
release any property "if forfeiture or retention of actual custody
is unnecessary," but does not require the state to do so. 59
Instead, the state is authorized to sell the property and use a
portion of the proceeds, after deducting reasonable expenses
incurred, to satisfy exempt interest holders."6
The U.C.S.A. Amendments are similar to the C.ER.A. in
requiring the filing of either a request for recognition of an
administrative exemption or a demand for ajudicial proceeding
within thirty days of the service of notice of the administrative
forfeiture proceeding.'6 ' Unlike the C.ER.A., if a request for
recognition of an administrative exemption is fied, the state is
required to prepare a statement of exempt or non-exempt
interests. 6  Although the state may elect to commence
judicial forfeiture proceedings, it must do so within ninety days
of the initial seizure of property or the filing of a forfeiture
lien,' 63 and must prepare the statement of exempt and non-
exempt interests for parties which request such a statement.
64
Unlike the C.ER.A., the mere filing of a request for recognition
155. Id. § II(a)(4).
156. Id. § 11(a)(4)(A).
157. Id. § 4(h).
158. Id. § 11(a) (4) (C), (D).
159. Id. § 10(b).
160. Id. §§ 10(h), (i), 20(a), (b).
161. U.C.S. § 512(e).
162. Id. § 513(f)(1).
163. Id. § 519(a).
164. Id. § 512(f).
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of an administrative exemption does not extend for 180 days the
time in which the state may commence judicial proceedings.
The U.C.S.A. requires the state to prepare a statement of
exempt and non-exempt interests within ninety days."6  A
party whose interests are listed as non-exempt may demand a
judicial forfeiture proceeding within thirty days of receipt of the
statement.1 The statement of exempt and non-exempt interests
is binding upon the state, except with respect to a party which
demands a judicial forfeiture proceeding in response to the
initiation of an administrative forfeiture proceeding or which
files a demand for a judicial proceeding within thirty days of
receiving a statement classifying its interests as non-exempt167
If no party demands ajudicial proceeding after the preparation
of the statement of exempt and non-exempt interests, the
statement is deemed to be final."6 Thereafter, if no interest
in the property is found to be forfeitable, the property must be
released to the owner and any forfeiture lien removed. 69 If
one or more interests are forfeitable and others are exempt, the
state must either transfer the property in a manner agreeable to
the exempt owners and the state or transfer or dispose of the
property "in a manner that protects the owners of exempt
interests as completely as they would be protected... [from] an
ordinary judgment creditor of the owner of the forfeited
interest."'70
The procedures for the release of property through
administrative forfeiture proceedings under the C.F.R.A. and the
U.C.S. . differ in several important respects. First, the C.F.R.A.
extends the time for commencingjudicial forfeiture proceedings
for up to 270 days if a request for recognition of an administra-
tive exemption is filed.' 71  Under the C.F.RA the state is
apparently free to ignore the request and simply defer initiating
judicial proceedings for an additional 180 days.' 72  The
U.C.S.A., however, requires the state to either respond to the
165. Id. § 513(f)(1).
166. Id. § 513(0(3).
167. Cf id. § 513(f) (4).
168. Id. § 513(f) (3).
169. Id. § 522(b).
170. Id. § 522(d)(1).
171. C.F.R.A. § 11 (a) (1) (A), (a)(4).
172. Id. § 11 (a) (4) (D).
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request for a statement of exempt or non-exempt interests
within 120 days173 or release the property within ninety days of
seizure or the filing of a forfeiture lien. 74 Second, the
C.F.R.A. does not mandate the release of property to non-
exempt interest holders if all interests have been found to be
exempt. Instead, it allows the sale of the property and the
recovery of its expenses, even against innocent owners. 75 The
U.C.S.A., in contrast, requires the release of property to exempt
owners.7 6  Finally, if certain interests are recognized as ex-
empt and other interests are non-exempt, the only remedy
mandated under the C.F.R.A. is the sale of property and the
allocation of proceeds in the order of priority of exempt
interests. Under the U.C.S.A., however, the state is first required
to reach agreement with exempt owners regarding a voluntary
plan of distribution.177 If agreement cannot be reached, the
sale of the property is not mandated, but instead the state
assumes the rights of a judgment creditor of the owner whose
interests are subject to forfeiture.
178
MY CONCLUSION
This article discusses some of the most important
differences between the C.F.R.A. and the 1994 Amendments to
the U.C.S.A. The differences between the C.FR.A. and the
U.C.S.A. are reflective of a fundamental difference in perspec-
tive and orientation between the Conference and the Commis-
sion. The C.ERA. represents a continuation of law enforce-
ment strategies popular in the 1980s and 1990s which sought to
aggressively expand the scope and utilization of forfeiture as a
valuable adjunct to more traditional law enforcement tech-
niques. The C.F.RA. proceeds from the perspective that more
powerful and flexible forfeiture laws are needed to pursue law
enforcement objectives and that prosecutorial discretion can
provide adequate protection for innocent property owners and
legitimate commercial transactions. In contrast, the 1994
amendments to the U.C.SA. seek to more narrowly focus and
173. U.C.SA § 513(c), (f)(1).
174. Id. § 519(a).
175. C.F.R.A. § 10(h).
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refine forfeiture laws, allowing them to combat more effectively
the misuse of property for illegal activity while providing
expanded procedural and substantive protections of the rights
of innocent property owners.
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